ABSTRACT
As a strategic response to the terrorist threat faced by countries the world over, many states have introduced governmental counter-terrorism policies or what may be called attempts aimed at deradicalisation and prevent strategies. These are intended to assist the public agencies and departments in understanding their role in dealing with terrorism as well as to assist investigations by local authorities and firefighters in dealing with radicalised combatants (Lowe, 2018: 58). For instance, the UK’s CONTEST policy is based on four “p”s – prepare, protect, prevent and pursue – which echoes closely the EU counter-terrorism strategy, which is also based on four strands of disengagement and exit strategies, and the Canadian Government’s counter-terrorism strategy, which has four strands to it. The US policy listed in the National Strategy for Counter-terrorism also discusses the measures and procedures that have been strengthened in order to “improve” US capabilities in countering terrorism, especially by preventing it from occurring (Ibid: 59). China is no exception; it too grapples with the threat of radicalisation at various levels in different parts of its territories. Keeping this in mind, it has initiated several measures as a prevent strategy in view of increased radicalisation, both religious and ethnic, in Xinjiang over the last two decades. Heeding the clarion call given by many scholars who had warned of the likely “Palestinisation” of conflict in Xinjiang if alternative strategies are not adopted for conflict resolution, China has brought in prevent strategies to curtail the menace of severe political and social instability, often instigated by troublesome forces, organisations and mechanisms from abroad. This also bears from the fact that China’s approach of using development as an antidote to ethnic tensions in Xinjiang has failed miserably, forcing it to adopt prevent strategies against terrorist elements.
