ABSTRACT
Scholars of Mary Wollstonecraft generally note the important role that friendship plays in her social and political philosophy. Limited attention, however, has been paid to Wollstonecraft’s view that the parent/child bond is to be thought of as friendship. This article shows that the model of friendship driving Wollstonecraft’s understanding of all social ties is Aristotelian virtue friendship. It then addresses two problems Wollstonecraft must overcome in treating the parent/child relation as a virtue friendship: first, that the equal standing necessary to a virtue friendship is lacking in the parent/child bond insofar as the child’s moral development and emotional and intellectual maturity are not on a par with that of her parents; second, that the emphasis on moral desert or merit in virtue friendship seems misplaced when considering the parent/child bond: more than all other social ties, the parent/child bond is not thought to be dependent on the child’s (or the parent’s) excellent moral character. Wollstonecraft overcomes these hurdles by showing, first, that moral development occurs as a child moves from loving others for the benefit she receives from them (friendships of utility), to loving them for their virtuous qualities (virtue friendship); and second, that although there is ‘partiality’ in the parent/child bond, it is justified on the same grounds that justify any virtue friendship.
