ABSTRACT
The optimism that followed the late 20th century “Third Wave” of democratization (Huntington, 1993) now seems a distant memory. It is now clear that the diffusion of political and civic freedoms, which swept aside the Soviet Union and several other despotic regimes, was not as irresistible as it once seemed. The early 21st century has witnessed major reversals in democracy’s fortunes, most notably in Russia. Meanwhile, several authoritarian regimes seem to have conceded little to democracy’s supposed advance. China remains firmly under one-party rule, while the likes of Singapore remain wedded to their illiberal, electoral authoritarian systems. Furthermore, most countries that got rid of highly despotic regimes did not transition to liberal democracy but to in-between systems that retained many authoritarian features. Compounding the sense of despair, the United States—home to the world’s longest running experiment in democracy and its prime exporter of liberal values—showed in its choice of 45th president that government by deliberation remains vulnerable to demagoguery. Together, these developments have prompted talk of democracy being in recession. This claim is debatable, but what is quite clear is that the autocratic exercise of power has turned out to be far more sustainable than teleological thinking about democracy had assumed. No country remains static, but the idea that most are destined for a common end point—an explicit or implicit assumption behind much comparative research—is being replaced by the acknowledgment of multiple modernities (Jacques, 2009).
