ABSTRACT
When we consider paradigmatically evil acts such as genocide, forced mass starvation, or war rape, the immense and/or perverse suffering of victims seems to be both necessary and sufficient for such acts to be properly labeled “evil.” If this is correct, then what have perpetrators and their characteristics to do with understanding the nature of evil? After a survey and comparison of prominent consequentialist harm-based and perpetrator-based theories of evil, as well as a discussion of their conceptual advantages and disadvantages, I shall explain why the examination of the moral psychology of perpetrators is a necessary element of any robust account of the nature of moral evil. Specifically, I adapt lessons from the Kantian theory of evil to argue that consequentialist accounts describe the symptoms but not the causes of evil and that evil is often an invisible enemy that hides behind reason and good conduct. Consequently, a complete definition of evil must give conceptual priority to the moral character of perpetrators rather than solely attending to the suffering they bring about.
