ABSTRACT
In the last few minutes, a peacock has landed on the fence of my back garden. I can see it quite clearly. Thus, on the one hand, there is my act of seeing—an intentional act. On the other, there is the peacock seen—the intentional object of that act. As an intentional object of my act of seeing, the peacock has a specific type of being that Sartre labels being-in-itself. On the other hand, my consciousness of the peacock—in this case, my act of seeing—has a type of being Sartre labels being for-itself. Being for-itself is a very different sort of being than being in-itself. Indeed, Sartre would often characterize being for-itself as nothingness. This is, prima facie, a strange characterization. What could Sartre mean by describing consciousness as nothingness? Explaining what Sartre meant by this and, indeed, defending this seemingly strange claim, is the first task of this chapter.
