ABSTRACT
Britain, France, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire stumbled into war in 1853—54. The immediate cause was a French demand that Roman Catholic priests rather than Orthodox Christian monks control Holy Sites in Palestine (which was under Ottoman control). The newly installed French emperor, Napoleon III, the nephew of the great Napoleon, was seemingly motivated by a desire for international prestige—to undo the humiliations of Waterloo—and initially the Turks did accede to his demands. This change was completely unacceptable to the Russians who were deeply religious and who saw the dispute as part of a bigger issue: who should have sovereignty over the Christians living within the Ottoman Empire (they formed approximately one-third of the Ottoman population). The British were motivated by fears that Russia’s true intent was to dismantle—and expand into—the ever weaker Ottoman Empire. The British believed that this would fatally upset the balance of power in Europe, increasing the risk of evermore conflict, and that it might jeopardise British interests in India. While the situation was highly unstable, had the British been able to take a strong stand with respect to this evolving crisis—either warning the Ottomans that they, the British, would not support aggressive Turkish action, or alternatively, warning the Russians that they, the British, would support the Turks if the latter were attacked—it is possible one or the other side would have backed down and war could have been averted. Unfortunately, the British cabinet was badly split. Lord Aberdeen, the prime minister, and his allies wanted to maintain good relations with Russia and to avoid war. Lord Palmerston, the Home Secretary, led a cabinet faction convinced that a strong response to the Russian ambitions was necessary, even if it led to war, although he expected the Russians would back down. Palmerston and his allies had British public opinion firmly on their side: the dispute was widely seen as one pitting liberal Britain against Russian autocracy.
