ABSTRACT
Frequent reference to the concept of human dignity as a normative principle is a distinctive feature of German bioethical discussion. On the one hand, the concept plays a major role in the moral rejection and legal prohibition of some of the new methods of reproduction and of gene manipulation. On the other hand, it is typically invoked, both by ethicists and lawyers, as a kind of ultimate article of faith rather than as a principle open to rational debate. Its typical function is that of a ‘conversation stopper’ (J. F. Keenan) apparently settling an issue once for all and tolerating no further discussion. The explanation of this phenomenon seems to be sociological rather than philosophical. The more pluralistic the values of a society become, and the more relativistic its thinking about these values, the more strongly the need is felt for a taboo concept defining, in a negative way, its residual moral identity. This may help to explain the characteristic absoluteness and emotionality associated with the concept. At the same time, it signals an inevitable intellectual quandary: It is difficult to argue for a taboo. Either a taboo is deeply felt and firmly established in a society, so that it is unnecessary to argue for it; or, as in a pluralistic society as ours, the taboo is no longer shared by all, so that it becomes increasingly difficult for the majority to convince the dissenting minority by argument.
