Is the desire for a child too strong? or Is there a right to a child of one’s own?

The double title of this paper points to my uneasiness concerning the ethical approach appropriate to normative problems in connection with the phenomenon of infertility. Can an ethicist sincerely presume to decide whether the desire for a child is too strong? I am convinced that no arrogance of moral speculation will be able to destroy the strength and authenticity of an ethics of desire. Leaving the sphere of privacy, the philosopher moves to an ethics of rights in order to repeat the disturbing question in a different, more objective voice: is there a right to a child? A child of one’s own? Having explored the right-based approach the ethicist discovers that this path leads to some structural clarifications which are useful for the public debate. But the puzzle of desire will continue to irritate our moral investigation. The paper wants to offer nothing more than some tentative comments on the oscillating movements between an ethics of rights and an ethics of desire. They represent a mutual challenge and a necessary ambivalence in the foundation of applied ethics.