ABSTRACT
When discussing the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and power, it is a useful start to put out largely consensual definitions of both and analyse connections already at a basic semantic level. To do so, we will adopt a definition of conspiracy beliefs as a conviction that there is or was a ‘secret plan on the part of some group to influence events by partly secret means’ (Pigden 2015: 5). Missing from this approach is a certain magnitude or relevance of the above mentioned events. It seems reasonable that the suspicion of a secretly organised birthday party does not constitute a conspiracy theory. Past research has shown that conspiracy theories are more likely to relate to events that are perceived as collectively threatening (Kofta, Sedek 2005), and large and impactful (LeBoeuf, Norton 2011). This said, there needs to be a socially or politically relevant action harming others that few people have conjointly decided to make happen without making this fact of prior planning transparent (thus often implying additional steps to cover this fact, although this is not necessarily implied). By this definition, the notion that the Elders of Zion have met and decided how to secretly take over the world is a conspiracy theory, whereas the European Commission deciding to implement stricter limits of C.O.2 emissions for new cars is not (as it is clearly transparent). The idea again that the European Commission met with Chinese bike manufacturers to make this decision would be a conspiracy theory (when the role of Chinese bike manufacturers in the decision process is not made public). The (factually wrong) claim that vaccines cause autism is, in and of itself, not a conspiracy theory. Insinuating, however, that vaccine producers and/or health commissions know this fact is implying a conspiracy by omission, deciding not to remove something that is knowingly harmful.
