ABSTRACT
One of the striking features of the scholarship devoted to conspiracy theories is an acutely felt need to define the object of study. The study of other objects, by contrast, does not appear to labour under the same onus. Students of literature are not burdened to the same degree with the duty of defining, say, what an autobiography is, anthropologists can describe their experiences in the field without feeling compelled to submit a definition of shamanism and political scientists can discuss declining membership in trade unions without feeling the same pressure to first determine what constitutes the essence of such an organisation. As impressionistic as this observation might be, it can nevertheless serve as a springboard for some reflections about what intellectual commitments we are actually making by prefacing our inquiry into conspiracy theories with the search for a definition. What alternative avenues of inquiry we foreclosing – perhaps inadvertently or unconsciously – as a result of treating the object of study in this manner?
