After many years in the philosophical wilderness, judgment is enjoying something of a resurgence. Traditionally, it has been a central subject of philosophical inquiry: it was investigated by ancient theorists (Nuchelmans 1973; Perala 2013), and it played a prominent role in modern philosophy (Nuchelmans 1984; Moltmann and Textor 2017). 1 As recently as the early and even mid-twentieth century, philosophers such as Bertrand Russell (1910, 1912, 1913/1984) and Peter Geach (1957) devoted themselves to developing theories of judgment. But in the late twentieth century, the topic fell out of favour, with belief becoming the primary target of investigation in this area of philosophical psychology: for instance, ‘belief’ and ‘propositional attitude’ both get lengthy entries in the index of W. V. O. Quine’s enormously influential (1960) book, Word and Object; ‘judgment’, by contrast, does not figure.