One of the most interesting aspects of the Lebanese crisis of 1982-84 has been the interplay of Soviet and Syrian policy as the crisis developed Moscow, with its global perspective, has had to juxtapose concents about its relationship with the United States and Western Europe with its efforts to support its ally, Syria, and to exploit the Lebanese crisis to increase Soviet influence in the Middle East Syria, by contrast, could concentrate on its regional goals during the crisis, all the while seeking to extract the maximum in Soviet support for Syrian objectives, especially the maintenance of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon. This study will examine the interplay of Soviet and Syrian policies in five specific periods of the crisis: (1) die period from the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 until the death of Brezhnev in November 1982; (2) the period from the accession of Andropov through the May 1983 war scare; (3) the September 1983 period of fighting between the Gemayel government, backed by die U.S., and the Shii and Druze forces, backed by Syria; (4) the period from the destruction of U.S. Marine headquarters in October 1983 until the U.S. attack on Syrian anti-aircraft positions in December 1983; and (5) the period from the abrupt U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon in February 1984 until the abrogation of the Israeli-Lebanese treaty in March 1984.