This essay on Moscow's perceptions of recent American involvement in the Middle East concerns itself with six issues. First, it describes Soviet perceptions of U.S. goals in the Middle East, narrowly defined as the eastern Mediterranean area, although there is also some discussion of the Persian Gulf. 1 Second, Moscow's assessment of the extent to which the United States is accomplishing its aims in the region is discussed. Particular attention is devoted to that period of the Lebanese crisis that began with the Israeli attack in June of 1982 and ended with the abrogation in 1984 of the agreement of May 17, 1983 between Israel and the Gemayel Government in Lebanon. The Soviet judgement is that America has suffered a substantial defeat in Lebanon that has negative implications for the United States throughout the region. 2 Third, one might expect that America's problems in the region would represent unadulterated gains for the Soviet Union, especially given the zero-sum game orientation of both superpowers regarding their relationship. This has not been the case. Moscow also has problems in the region, and interestingly some of these are closely related to those of Washington. These interconnections are explored at some length. Fourth, Moscow's assessment of problems and opportunities for Soviet policy towards the three key regional states of Israel, Egypt and Syria is discussed in the context of America's relations with those states. Fifth, some speculation is 52engaged in as to what policies the Soviets are likely to adopt towards those states in the foreseeable future. Finally, there is a brief analysis of the combined impact of recent developments in the region and the policies of the various actors on the prospects for a comprehensive peace.