ABSTRACT
Although U.S. policy over the last decade has either flirted with or openly attempted to use trade with the Soviet Union as a bargaining tool or lever, the assumptions, logic and probable outcomes of such a policy remain open to question. As is the case with most important policy matters in the United States, there are a variety of different perspectives on the feasibility of employing trade as an instrument to bring about more preferred Soviet policy. While personal attitudes and policies do not always fit into one perspective or another, there are two basic groups that include most actors with opinions on the subject. These two groups - the Bargainers and the Non-Bargainers - can each be divided into two additional groups. The first includes "comprehensive bargainers" who would use trade to bargain with the Soviet Union across the board, that is, on all aspects of their foreign and domestic policy. Another group, which might be called the "selective bargainers," are more discriminating in linking trade selectively to certain aspects of Soviet foreign policy. The Non-Bargainers, on the other hand, include two very different groups. The perspective of the first, the "pro-traders," is in favor of trade with no political strings attached. The second, the "anti-traders," oppose trade with the Soviets under any conditions or circumstances. The perspectives of each of these groups are based on a complex array of assumptions, logic and policy options bearing upon perceived security, political and economic consequences involving U.S.-Soviet trade. These "ideal-type" perspectives are illustrated below with examples from recent history.
