ABSTRACT
In spring 1986 the new General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, reinvigorated the issue of NATO/Warsaw Pact conventional arms control with an announcement of new Soviet initiatives. Expanded upon in the Warsaw Pact/Budapest Appeal several months later, these initiatives were surprising in their scope and startling because they moved away from entrenched Soviet positions and evidenced a willingness to be creative if not conclusive. What was new in the Gorbachev approach is difficult to overdramatize. First, seldom in the past had the Soviets found it in their interests to raise the issue of conventional arms control, while now, in a sudden role reversal, the reluctant old maid became the anxious young suitor. Second, Gorbachev explicitly adopted the Western geographic framework of "Atlantic to the Urals," and with it the inclusion of a large and significant area of Soviet territory. Third, in the new approach the Soviets overtly admitted that there might be certain areas of Soviet conventional superiority that would require an asymmetrical level of reduction on their side—a major variation from their classic if incredible position that an overall balance in conventional forces exists between the two blocs. Fourth, whereas the Soviets traditionally viewed verification as a Western plot for intrusive intelligence gathering, Gorbachev implied that Soviet forces on Soviet territory would be legitimate targets for inspection. Finally, whereas in the past the Soviets were content to withdraw whatever elements of their forward posture back to the motherland, Gorbachev raised the prospect of actually dismantling and destroying the equipment.
