It is a commonplace to observe that education is a highly value-laden notion and the general sense in which this is true was nicely captured in R.S. Peters’ (1966, p. 25) classic characterization of the concept as the transmission of something worthwhile in a morally acceptable manner. And formal definitions such as this apart, it is clear that the practice of education unavoidably exhibits certain values. For example, the selection of curriculum content and teaching style, discipline regimes, the use of praise, the teacher’s overt enthusiasms and ways of interacting with children, all do this. Yet notwithstanding this awareness of the ways in which values are embedded in education, there sometimes remains a tendency to see the development of children’s thinking as a purely cognitive matter-a ‘neutral’ getting them to ‘think better’: more logically, rationally, critically, creatively, etc. This stance is reinforced to some extent by the influence of notions of children’s thinking as passing through universal cognitive stages as for example argued by Piaget, or as being enhanced through the development of certain techniques or the acquisition of ‘executive thinking skills’ identified by metacognitive psychology.