The crucial novelty of the European Security Strategy lies in the identification of threats, a première for the Union. It identifies five major threats: international terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, failed states, and organised crime. Entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a better world’, the document focuses primarily on the ‘better world’ part, though it notes that the distinction between internal and external security is increasingly blurred. The document acknowledges that the traditional territorial form of defence, in a Cold War fashion, is a thing of the past. By underlining that ‘the first line of defence now lies abroad’, it implies a projection of power, soft and hard, that Europe was not used to exercising in a strategic fashion. Faced with a significantly deteriorated international environment, the Union cannot postpone its strategic dimension any longer; it cannot be a ‘pole of indifference’, especially when the ‘pole of power’, i.e. the United States, is engaged in a revolutionary agenda in world affairs (Wolfers 1962: 81-102). The spirit of the document is thus a tacit calling for a more extrovert and active role of the Union in the world. To undertake global responsibilities, unity in diplomacy and capabilities in defence are necessary conditions that the document duly reminds to all Member States, especially after the Iraqi fiasco and the too slow progress of the Helsinki Headline Goal.