ABSTRACT
A basic paradox lies at the heart of the wave of democratization that swept across Latin America in the waning decades of the 20th century. On one hand, new democratic regimes have proven to be more stable and resilient than virtually any observer anticipated when the wave began. This stability made it possible to hope that democratic consolidation would nally put an end to the historic pattern of pendular swings between authoritarian and democratic governance.1 On the other hand, the core representative institutions of liberal democracy-party systems in particular-proved to be remarkably fragile in many countries, and they generally inspired little in the way of public con dence or support. Paradoxically, then, democratic consolidation appeared to coincide with a “crisis of representation” and a generalized disillusionment with-or even the wholesale rejection of-the political establishment in much of the region.2 This crisis was manifested in widespread electoral volatility, the breakdown of party systems in a number of countries, and the rise of new protest movements and/or populist “outsiders” who frontally challenged the political establishment.
