The OECD has characterised Germany as ‘a highly innovative country engaged in several initiatives to draw the maximum benefi ts and opportunities of globalisation to address environmental problems while boosting its environmental industry sector’ (OECD 2007: 43). This seems a good characterisation especially for the climate policy since 1987. Germany has played both a political and economic leadership role in climate change policy: these can be characterised as ‘cognitive’ and ‘structural’ (see Chapter 1 by Wurzel and Connelly). As early as 1990, Germany made major political contributions to the generation of a better knowledge-base for a far-reaching global strategy to combat climate change, thus acting as a cognitive leader. After 1998 the concept of ecological modernisation (ökologische Modernisierung) became central under a Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Green Party coalition government (the so-called Red-Green coalition). Ecological modernisation was developed into the concept of ecological industrial policy (ökologische Industriepolitik) by an SPD Environmental Minister (Sigmar Gabriel) under an SPD and Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/ Christian Social Union (CSU) coalition (the so-called grand coalition). More important is the role of German climate policy for international lessondrawing, including the adoption of instruments like obligatory feed-in tariffs. Germany’s leadership role in international climate change politics is to a high degree characterised by demonstration effects and leadership by example. The policy outcomes are therefore important for explaining Germany’s leadership role within the European Union (EU) and on the international level. As early as 2007 Germany had surpassed its ambitious Kyoto target (-21 per cent), achieving a 21.3 per cent reduction of its greenhouse gas emissions (GHGE) compared to the 1990 base year. A broad range of economic co-benefi ts of this policy is part of this ‘success story’. Germany’s economic strength, advanced innovation system and political visibility were necessary structural conditions for a leadership role as an international ‘trend setter’ (Jänicke 2008). The will and skill of central environmental policy actors including highly competent environmental

ministers (Klaus Töpfer (CDU) 1987-94, Angela Merkel (CDU) 1994-98, Jürgen Trittin (Greens) 1998-2005 and Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) 2005-9) were also important. Germany’s international leadership role would not have been possible without the support of Chancellors Helmut Kohl (CDU, 1982-98), Gerhard Schröder (SPD, 1998-2005) and Angela Merkel (CDU, since 2005). Of particular importance was the role that Chancellor Merkel played during the G8 summit in Heiligendamm (Germany) in 2007, where an expression of entrepreneurial leadership in international climate change politics could be observed. Germany’s climate policy exerts an even stronger international infl uence as a result of its economic success and the enormous boom in its domestic ‘climate protection industry’. This effect has increased with the creation of lead markets and international activities such as the foundation of a renewable energy network (2002, 2004) and the lobby for the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) which was launched in Bonn in 2009. All these initiatives helped to increase Germany’s exports of climate-friendly energy technology, resulting in a competitive challenge for other countries. This is an important factor in German structural leadership in climate policy.