In the West, two major models of secularization have been paramount: the French model based on laïcité [laicism) and the Protestant model that operates within the framework of religion, cutting ties with the Catholic model and infusing democratic ideals and individual subjectivity within the religious mindset. In the Islamic world, and particularly in Iran, the two models co-exist side by side. There is no clear-cut choice of one or the other, although the Protestant model seems to be the most pertinent. One major feature of this new type of secularization within the framework of Islam is ambivalence. This has been accentuated by the role of the State,1 which is a theocracy in Iran and which pushes for positioning individuals and institutions toward Islam in general, and the specific interpretation of Islam based on the concept of velayat-e faqih (the political domination of Islamic jurists) in particular. The youth in Iran is not a monolithic social group, as is often the case in other complex societies. One major rift within Iranian youth is that between those living in small towns or traditional cities and those living in the large cities. Qom is a traditionalist city, home of the major ayatollahs [senior Shi’i Islamic clergy and scholars] and their seminaries [howzeh]. Here, a new youth has emerged, one that shares some of the features of its elders but also has many new characteristics that give it its peculiarity. As will be demonstrated in this chapter, ambivalence toward many significant social and cultural issues is one of the major characteristics of this youth. Contrary to the dominant trend within the Iranian intelligentsia that interprets ambivalence in a negative sense (see below), I propose here a dynamic view of ambivalence with regard to the behavior patterns of the young girls and boys in Qom. The changes within the family, the affective relations, marriage, politics, the clergy, and the world at large are at the core of this ambivalence.