Finally, the jurisprudential underpinnings of Victorian common law profited from attempts to place it on a scientific basis. Analytic jurisprudence, the legacy of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Austin (17901859), reacted strongly against the intellectual complacency associated with William Blackstone and Lord Eldon. While the attempt at comprehensive codification failed, nevertheless the demands for a science of law gave to the common law a more rational structure. Analytic jurisprudence did little to influence the development of the common law itself, but did contribute greatly to the understanding of how the legal system operated. Central to this venture was the distinction between law and morality, the necessity to separate the law as it was from the law as it ought to be. Many Victorian jurists accepted the distinction as a starting point for jurisprudence even if they did not apply the formula rigorously. Analytic jurisprudence represented the foremost intellectual movement within the Victorian common law.