ABSTRACT
In the summer of 1998, India carried out five nuclear tests at Pokhran site on May 11 and two on May 13, thereby ending the prolonged restraint it exercised in acquiring the nuclear weapons. After declaring itself a de facto nuclear-weapon power, India promulgated a draft nuclear doctrine inAugust 1999 which outlined the rationale for nuclear weapons in the country’s national security policy.The doctrine enunciated that India would build and maintain a credible minimum (nuclear) deterrent posture, and the policy of “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states. The draft nuclear doctrine once again reaffirmed India’s long-standing commitment to the goal of universal nuclear disarmament.While the international community was critical of India’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons, less than a decade later, India has been able to engage with the United States and the international community to end its isolation in the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. After declaring itself a de facto nuclear-weapon power in 1998, India undertook additional
measures to ensure fullest compliance with the existing nuclear nonproliferation norms. Despite not being a member of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), India became more supportive of various nonproliferation measures and agreed to work with the United States and the global community to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. India took the lead in synchronizing its export controls with current international standards. It has extended its support to various global initiatives for safeguarding nuclear materials and technologies, as a means to enhance the nuclear safety and security. After 1998, there were widespread fears and apprehensions that the possible India-Pakistan
military clash over the Kashmir dispute, without proper command and control mechanisms, would escalate into a major nuclear exchange. In the absence of sustained cooperation and crisis management systems, the attainment of a mutually stable deterrent has proven to be difficult.1
While terrorism has been one of the serious challenges to India’s national security for over three decades, the country has shown considerable restraint and responsibility in responding to incidents of cross-border terrorism. Despite escalation of tensions after the terrorist attacks on the Indian parliament in 2001 and the Mumbai terrorist strikes in 2008, India chose to refrain from exercising the military option against terrorist groups across its border. Rather, India has preferred to engage with Pakistan through confidence-building measures on issues such as
terrorism, nuclear stability and the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. India’s overall strategic restraint in the use of force also guides its nuclear policy which has shaped its official thinking on nuclear escalation control and achieving the durable deterrence stability. This chapter analyses the various motivations in historical context that shaped the Indian
approaches to the use of nuclear weapons and subsequently its decision to cross the nuclear threshold in the late 1990s.The chapter is organized in three main sections.The first section analyses the motivations and decisions pertaining to India’s nuclear-weapon program in three distinct historical periods, culminating in the May 1998 nuclear tests.The second section maps out India’s engagement with the international community, particularly the United States on nuclear nonproliferation-related issues after Pokhran II, which facilitated its gradual integration into the global nuclear order.The final section evaluates the current proliferation challenges in South Asia from the Indian perspective and discusses the relevance of various nonproliferation alternatives.
