ABSTRACT
With a plethora of new delivery systems and rising fissile material production rates, India and Pakistan continue to defy the global normative nonproliferation regime.1 These nuclear investments are a symptom of the intense strategic competition that has embroiled India and Pakistan for decades and is now entering a third distinct phase. In the first phase (1974-1998), both states challenged the nonproliferation regime by developing and demonstrating their respective nuclear capabilities. In the second phase (1998-2013), both countries focused on developing operational deterrence force postures, doctrines, and command and control systems. In the ongoing third phase, nuclear capabilities are modernizing and expanding to encompass seabased delivery systems, completing the third leg of the nuclear “triad.” Rivalry and distrust between India and Pakistan are the central drivers for this nuclear arms
race, and lately, global power politics have been exacerbating these tensions. As the United States pivots to the Asia-Pacific, China feels threatened and increases its defense spending, which in turn spurs India to develop and modernize its own strategic and conventional forces, to include Agni intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and Sagarika submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).Western powers tacitly endorse India’s strategic ambitions and military investments as a means of “containing” China’s rise, but meanwhile, Pakistan finds itself increasingly vulnerable. Pakistan is geographically exposed to Indian attack and lacks the resources to compete with India’s superior conventional military. Islamabad relies on nuclear weapons to offset this imbalance and has most recently introduced battlefield-range systems, such as the 60 km-range Nasr. In essence, the Asia-Pacific rebalance is indirectly fueling the Indo-Pakistani rivalry and incentivizing the expansion of their nuclear arsenals. As in the past, the international community does not desire an unhealthy arms race between
India and Pakistan.Yet there is no discernable policy or visible involvement in the region that could mitigate regional tensions or resolve a conflict set in motion.The lack of coherent international effort to dampen Indo-Pakistani competition and integrate the two states into the nonproliferation regime has given them carte blanche to double-down on their efforts to expand and improve their strategic arsenals. South Asia therefore continues to fly in the face of the global nonproliferation regime in the twenty-first century. The first section of this chapter will assess the current status and upward trajectories of
Indian and Pakistani strategic forces. The second section examines the evolving military doctrines and command and control arrangements.The third section examines how regional
political dynamics have aggravated the Indo-Pakistani arms race, with specific emphasis on the implications of the A.Q. Khan affair, the US-India nuclear deal, the US rebalance to the AsiaPacific, and the lack of progress in regional confidence-building measures (CBMs).The final section concludes with some prospects for regional peace and stability and some recommendations for consideration.
