Physicalism 1 is confronted with well-known anti-physicalist arguments such as the knowledge argument (Jackson 1982), the explanatory gap argument (Levine 1983), and the conceivability argument (Kripke 1980; Block 1980). These arguments are based on the phenomenal character of consciousness, the distinctive what-it-is-likeness of undergoing experiences such as seeing the blue sky, tasting red wine, or being in pain. In the contemporary debate, the phenomenal concept strategy (Stoljar 2005) is considered one of the most powerful responses to these anti-physicalist arguments. The basic idea of this strategy is to rely on special concepts-phenomenal concepts — to explain why we draw dualist conclusions from these arguments. Hence, the goal of the phenomenal concept strategy is to give a satisfactory account of dualist intuitions without being committed to ontological dualist conclusions.