ABSTRACT
‘Deradicalization’ as a concept denotes a process of individual or collective cognitive change from criminal, radical or extremist identities to a non-criminal or moderate psychological state. ‘Deradicalization’ has to be strongly differentiated from ‘Disengagement’, which denotes the mere behavioural role change (from offending to non-offending) while leaving the ideological or psychological aspect aside (cf. Bjørgo and Horgan, 2009; Dechesne, 2011; Horgan, 2009b; Horgan and Braddock, 2010; Noricks, 2009). Thus, individuals can be disengaged (i.e. not engaging criminal behaviour) while still being committed to a radical ideology. On the other hand, it may also happen that individuals remain part of a radical group and commit crimes without adhering to the cause. ‘Deradicalization’ and ‘Disengagement’ belong to the arsenal of interventional anti-terrorism and counter-extremism tools (in addition to repression and prevention tools). Still, the term remains, for the most part, inadequately defined or conceptualized (Horgan and Braddock, 2010), although it has a strong counterpart in criminological desistance research. Differentiating between primary and secondary desistance (Farrall and Maruna, 2004; Gadd, 2006; Maruna, 2001, 2004; Maruna et al., 2006), Maruna et al. describe “the movement from the behaviour of non-offending to the assumption of the role or identity of a ‘changed person’” (Maruna et al., 2006: 274), which “involve[s] identifiable and measurable changes at the level of personal identity or the ‘me’ of the individual” (ibid.: 274; cf. Giordano et al., 2002; Lemert, 1951; Maruna, 2001; Shover, 1996).
