ABSTRACT
In the field of statebuilding (as the means of building peace through liberal institutionalization), hybridity refers to the outcome of conjoining internal and external beliefs about state management. In terms that apply to the modern process of globalization, of which statebuilding can be seen as but one element, Nyoongah Mudrooroo refers to hybridity as ‘part of the contestational weave of cultures’ (1990: 24), recalling the permanence throughout history of different people and cultures seeking hegemony in different ways. Hybridity is a constant in regime change and has been thoroughly debated in the literature on democracy and development, to name but two areas of research (Diamond, 2002; Migdal, 1974). Despite this, its appearance in the postconflict statebuilding literature has caused something akin to a rumbling. What was being suggested was that statebuilding did not happen on a tabula rasa; that there was something already there that may either resist what is privileged in international statebuilding, or at least adapt or manipulate it. This notion seemed to take some liberal commentators by surprise. Certainly, the limited reference to how local actors react to global influences in the orthodox literature suggests that it was not a matter being taken seriously. This material tends to be more concerned with the technical aspects of developing statebuilding and peacebuilding intervention and refining existing assumptions and practices, rather than confronting data that substantially challenge the legitimacy of hegemonic approaches and wisdom. But hybridity has always been with us and is here to stay, and the purpose of this chapter is to review where we have come from and where we are going, to adapt a Cambodian aphorism, with the meaning and consequences of hybridity in international statebuilding.
