ABSTRACT
The overall map of the insurgency, its spread and its composition are quite well known. The dominant force within the insurgency is the Army of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, popularly known as the Taliban. It accounts for about 80 per cent of the total force of the political insurgents. The second group in terms of strength is Hizb-I Islami, which accounts for about 10 per cent, but has also links to many former members who operate as part of the Taliban, particularly away from eastern Afghanistan where the organizational structure of the party is strongest. The rest of the insurgency is largely marginal: a couple of small Salafi groups in eastern Afghanistan, with a strength of no more than a few hundred each; some independent commanders here and there, mostly in western Afghanistan, and a number of non-Afghan organizations operating inside Afghan territory. These include mostly Pakistani groups, of which the most active is Lashkar-e Taiba, and Central Asian groups, of which the main one is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The contribution of these groups to the ‘jihad’ in Afghanistan is significant mainly at the local level; eastern Afghanistan for most Pakistani groups and northern Afghanistan for the IMU. Their contribution appears valuable mostly in terms of their indirect support: training seems to be provided to Taliban by both the IMU and the Pakistani groups. Some complex attacks are carried out with the infusion of groups of specialists from Pakistan, which contribute skills in sniping, explosive and team weapons (Giustozzi 2008; Giustozzi and Reuter 2010). The size of the insurgency is more or less clear too, although there are different ways of counting. The number of full-time fighters in mid 2010 was around 30,000, of which up to 4,000 may have been foreigners; there are also tens of thousands of part-time fighters, facilitators, political cadres, of which almost none are foreigners. There are also tens of thousands of men active in illegal armed groups, which are not directly connected to the insurgency, although sometimes may entertain relations with them. Mostly the latter groups avoid fighting the security forces and the foreign troops, but sometimes clash with the police. The mass of part-timers, facilitators and political cadres are the least discussed component of the insurgency, because they either operate in the shadows or are local in character. Part-timers might sometimes be seen by the Taliban as integral part of the movement, but other times they might be seen as external allies mobilized by communities in defence of their own interests. The degree of involvement of each community can vary greatly, from full Talibanization, where pro-Taliban clerics take over control of the community, to a superficial alliance of community elders who have little to share with the Taliban’s ideology and worldview. There is some evidence that many community elders might have allowed the Taliban into their territory initially as a way of signalling their displeasure to the central government, which has been neglecting local elders since its inception in 2001. The Taliban, however, have demonstrated themselves as quite adept at manipulating local elders for their own purposes and once they establish themselves in a region it has proven difficult to get rid of them (Giustozzi 2008, 2009a, 2009b).
