ABSTRACT

Games, which were estimated at ¥4 billion. In the sport of gymnastics, for example, the investment in medals rose from around ¥20 million per year over 2001-2003 to ¥80 million per year over 2003-2004.1

As the global economy struggles to move out of recession it is unlikely that the increased pace of investment will be maintained, but explaining the willingness of governments of a variety of ideological hues to expend public resources so freely over the previous 10-15 years is still surprising: after all, it is only sport. Not only is understanding the motives for such heavy government funding a requirement, but it is also important to consider when the upward trend in funding will level off and begin to decline. In relation to the motives for such high levels of expenditure one needs to acknowledge that public policy is rarely the product of the accumulation of evidence, but is more likely to be the product of the interaction between interests, deep-rooted myths, contemporary ideology and selective use of evidence. As regards the evidence base, the only unequivocal evidence related to elite success is the strong correlation between funding and winning medals. In other words, the impact of public expenditure on elite sport policy objectives has been clearly positive: the more governments spend on the preparation of elite athletes the greater are their chances of winning medals. Needless to say, this bold statement needs some qualification, not least of which is that if the other major sports powers are also increasing their expenditure then ‘success’ might mean retaining rather than increasing a country’s share of Olympic medals. However, if one is searching for evidence then this is one of the few statements that can be made with confidence. Indeed, numerous researchers have indicated the weakness of the evidence base in relation to claims of elite sport’s capacity to deliver on objectives, whether those objectives are to increase general participation in sport (Carmichael and Grix, 2011; Feddersen et al., 2009; Girginov and Hills, 2008; Green, 2006) or to increase national morale (what is sometimes referred to as the ‘feelgood’ factor) (Grix and Carmichael, 2012). The steady climb in investment in elite sport is much more clearly the outcome of the effectiveness of the mythologising about elite sport by politicians, sports administrators and the media (for example, that it reflects the character of a nation and that it develops positive personal qualities related to teamwork, leadership and values of fair play) and the recognition by politicians that elite sport success is a malleable resource that they can use in relation to a variety of diplomatic, welfare and economic objectives in the confident expectation of public acceptance of its legitimacy and potential effectiveness. Despite the weak evidence base for any general social or other benefits arising from elite sporting success at the Olympic Games, the apparent unwavering depth of governmental and public support for investment in elite sport development provides a very comfortable environment for those athletes and organisations concerned with the preparation of the UK Olympic squad for the London 2012 Games. While the particular socio-political context differs across countries, there is considerable uniformity in the assumptions that governments make about the capacity of elite sport success to achieve a wide range of non-sport objectives, and it is this confidence that underpins their willingness to continue to invest heavily at the elite level and to seek to gain a competitive advantage over their rivals. In the sections that follow three countries – the United Kingdom, South Korea and Japan – are used to illustrate not only the increasing expenditure on elite sport, but also the increasing sophistication in the use of that investment. In activities such as international sport, where a competitive advantage is sought, it is often the case that domestic policy innovation will be complemented and stimulated by the actions of competitor nations: domestic policy innovation and learning are complemented by policy transfer between countries. While a dramatic breakthrough in training or preparation techniques is sought, progress in improving the quality of an Olympic squad tends to be a slow and relatively gradual process, with performance at the previous Games providing feedback on the effectiveness

of medium-to long-term strategies. Thus, performance at Beijing 2008 will for some countries, such as the United Kingdom, provide confirmation that the policy direction is appropriate, while for others, such as Australia, it might begin to raise concerns about the effectiveness of current policy. What will be described and discussed below is often cautious policy refinement, incremental innovation and steady intensification rather than dramatic change. As is the case in the preparation of athletes, the typical pattern is the constant search for minor improvements across a range of factors rather than the revolutionary innovation.