Hilary Putnam’s contribution to the Michael Dummett volume of the Library of Living Philosophers, “Between Scylla and Charybdis: Does Dummett Have a Way Out?” (2007), is on the realism issue. He concludes a brief defense of Dummett’s anti-realism from my criticisms in Realism and Truth (1984/1991b) as follows: “Devitt’s dismissive attitude is as unphilosophical as Samuel Johnson’s stone-kicking” (2007: 159). Dummett responds with delight: “I very much enjoyed Hilary Putnam’s criticism of Michael Devitt’s attempted refutation of anti-realism, and thought it wholly to the point.” Dummett concludes that my argument is “a severe case of ignoratio elenchi” (2007: 184). My essay is a response to these harsh comments, against a background of

my thirty-year struggle with Putnam’s views on the realism issue.1