The last two chapters of Part D discussed the questions of what it is to choose or decide, and in what sense choices and decisions can be called ‘free’. Moral philosophy, which forms the topic of the following part of the encyclopaedia, is also concerned with people making decisions; it is concerned with people’s decisions that such and such is the right course of action, or is what ought to be done, or is one that will lead to something that is good. People who make such decisions (or who recommend others to make them, or who comment approvingly or disapprovingly on such decisions) are said to make ‘value judgements’, and moral philosophy is concerned with value judgements of a certain kind. I say ‘of a certain kind’; for not all value judgements are its concern. Contrast the following two groups of assertions:

(I) ‘I ought to use a chisel for that job,’ ‘The right thing for me to do would be to use a chisel,’ ‘By using so-and-so’s chisels, I will do a good job.’ (II) ‘I ought to return that loan,’ ‘It would be right for me to return that loan,’ ‘By returning that loan, I will contribute to the general good.’