This book, first published in 1987, is about the classic free will problem, construed in terms of the implications of moral responsibility. The principal thesis is that the core issue is metaphysical: can scientific laws postulate objectively necessary connections between an action and its causal antecedents? The author concludes they cannot, and that, therefore, free will and determinism can be reconciled.

chapter 1|212 pages


chapter 2|208 pages

The concept of moral responsibility

chapter 3|185 pages

Causal and moral responsibility

chapter 4|11 pages

Intention and moral responsibility

chapter 5|161 pages


chapter 6|153 pages


chapter 7|135 pages

Contingent necessity

chapter 8|101 pages

Laws as necessary truths

chapter 9|159 pages

The regularity theory of laws

chapter 10|65 pages


chapter 11|67 pages

Responsibility and psychological theory