The thesis of this book, first published in 1972, is that Kant’s notions of ‘absolute worth’, the ‘unconditioned’ and ‘unconditioned worth’ are rationalistic and confused, and that they spoil his ontology of personal value and tend to subvert his splendid idea of the person as an End in himself.

part |1 pages

Part One

chapter Chapter I|4 pages

Kant, Harris And The Absolute Value

chapter Chapter II|27 pages

Kant, Harris and the Absolute or Sovereign Good

chapter Chapter III|28 pages

The Argument In Kant: I

chapter Chapter IV|45 pages

The Argument in Kant: II

chapter Chapter V|26 pages

The New Strange Doctrine

part |1 pages

Part Two

chapter Chapter I|36 pages

The Ends Of Reason, Of Life And Of Duty

chapter Chapter II|24 pages

Virtue and Rewards

part |1 pages

Part Three

chapter Chapter I|20 pages

Kant’s Ontology Of Personal Value: A False Absolute

chapter Chapter II|35 pages

Rationality As Value: Towards A Humanistic Ontology