ABSTRACT
A timely contribution and incisive analysis, this is the story of the British experiment in privatizing the nuclear power industry and its subsequent financial collapse. It tells how the UK's pioneering role in nuclear power led to bad technology choices, a badly flawed restructuring of the electricity industry and the end of government support for
TABLE OF CONTENTS
chapter |6 pages
Introduction
part |2 pages
Part I The years of optimism (1945–1989)
chapter |12 pages
Influence of the bomb: Calder Hall and the Magnoxes (1945–1960)
chapter |15 pages
The AGRs and the reactor debates (1960–1978)
chapter |13 pages
The first privatisation attempt (1979–1989)
part |2 pages
Part II A focused industry (1990–1995)
chapter |20 pages
Humiliation and transformation (1990–1994)
chapter |8 pages
The birth of British Energy (1995)
part |2 pages
Part III Life in the private sector (1996–2002)
chapter |14 pages
Privatisation (1996)
chapter |19 pages
Hubris (1997–1999)
chapter |14 pages
Nemesis (1999–2001)
chapter |25 pages
Crisis (2001–2002)
part |2 pages
Part IV Analysis: The causes of the crisis
chapter |21 pages
Financial strategy
chapter |13 pages
Corporate strategy
chapter |10 pages
The power price collapse
chapter |7 pages
The British reactor legacy
chapter |9 pages
The BNFL contracts
part |2 pages
Part V Conclusions: The multiple causes of failure