The self for Kant is something real, and yet is neither appearance nor thing in itself, but rather has some third status. Appearances for Kant arise in space and time where these are respectively forms of outer and inner attending (intuition). Melnick explains the "third status" by identifying the self with intellectual action that does not arise in the progression of attending (and so is not appearance), but accompanies and unifies inner attending. As so accompanying, it progresses with that attending and is therefore temporal--not a thing in itself. According to Melnick, the distinction between the self or the subject and its thoughts is a distinction wholly within intellectual action; only such a non-entitative view of the self is consistent with Kant’s transcendental idealism. As Melnick demonstrates in this volume, this conception of the self clarifies all of Kant’s main discussions of this issue in the Transcendental Deduction and the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.

part |2 pages

Part I Preliminary Overview

chapter 1|9 pages

The Reality of the Thinking Subject

part |2 pages

Part II The Thinking Subject

chapter 3|10 pages

The First Paralogism

chapter 4|12 pages

The Second Paralogism

chapter 5|10 pages

Transcendental Self-Consciousness

chapter 6|12 pages

Other Interpretations of the Paralogisms

part |2 pages

Part III The Cognizing Subject

chapter 7|19 pages

Empirical Apperception

chapter 8|15 pages

Pure Apperception

part |2 pages

Part IV The Person as Subject

chapter 9|20 pages

Apperception and Inner Sense

part |2 pages

Part V The Subject and Material Reality

chapter 11|9 pages

The Embodied Subject

chapter 12|17 pages

The Fourth Paralogism