ABSTRACT
Now, for the first time, there is a comprehensive, eminently readable book designed to focus thinking in the area of contract law. This book bridges the gap between law and economics by confronting normative values that economists too often deem the preserve of moral philosophers. Contract theorists, on the other hand, are seldom in sympathy with economic efficiency norms. While free bargaining continues to be regarded with suspicion by legal scholars who are hostile to private ordering, the proper scope of free bargaining remains in dispute. Combined with a recent renewed interest in this field, these academic tensions mean that the time is right for a reconsideration of contract law.
Drawing on scholarship from diverse fields and using illuminating and erudite examples, Just Exchange is entertaining as well as informative. Of interest to economists, lawyers, public policy-makers and those intersted in contract theory, this volume is a valuable overview of a vital intersection between legal studies and economics.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
part |2 pages
PART I: The enforcement of contracts
chapter |19 pages
The promising game
chapter |13 pages
Rival theories of contract law
chapter |16 pages
The economic theory of contract law
chapter |10 pages
Fidelity to promising
part |2 pages
PART II: The limits of bargaining freedom