ABSTRACT
This title examines the role of the Europeans in the Cold War during the 'Khrushchev Era'. It was a period marked by the struggle for a regulated co-existence in a world of blocs, an initial arrangement to find a temporary arrangement failed due to German desires to quickly overcome the status quo. It was only when the danger of an unintended nuclear war was demonstrated through the crises over Berlin and Cuba that a tacit arrangement became possible, which was based on a system dominated by a nuclear arms race.
The book provides useful information on the role of Konrad Adenauer and the beginnings of the German 'new Eastern policy', as well as examining the Western European power policy in the era of Harold Macmillan and Charles de Gaulle.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
part |1 pages
PART I: EUROPE IN THE 'FIRST DÉTENTE', 1953–58
chapter |16 pages
Britain as a Bridge between East and West
chapter |11 pages
Adenauer’s Final Western Choice, 1955–58
part |1 pages
PART II: EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO THE BERLIN AND CUBAN CRISES, 1958–62
chapter |19 pages
Adenauer and Nuclear Deterrence
chapter |11 pages
France, NATO and the Algerian War
chapter |13 pages
De Gaulle’s Handling of the Berlin and Cuban Crises
chapter |10 pages
The Italian Communist Party between East and West, 1960–64
part |1 pages
PART III: EUROPE IN SEARCH OF DÉTENTE, 1962–65
chapter |17 pages
De Gaulle’s France and the Soviet Union from Conflict to Détente
chapter |13 pages
Khrushchev: Contemporary Perspectives in the Western Press
chapter |13 pages
The Western European Communist Parties in the Cold War, 1957–68
chapter |22 pages
Détente, the Superpowers and their Allies, 1962–64
part |1 pages
PART IV: DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE