This text is the second of three volumes written by Colonel Glantz on the contribution of intelligence and deception operations to the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. It examines the area where intelligence and operations overlap; the nature of co-ordination between the two; and the support provided by intelligence to operational planning and execution (or the absence of such support). This is not a study of intelligence work as such, but of how intelligence can improve the chances of success on the battlefield by facilitating the more effective and economical use of troops.

chapter 1|3 pages


chapter 2|5 pages

The Nature of Intelligence (Razvedka)

chapter 3|31 pages

To 1941

chapter 4|68 pages

The First Period of War

chapter 5|64 pages

The Stalingrad Counteroffensive

chapter 6|112 pages

The Kursk Operation

chapter 7|71 pages

The Vistula-Oder Operation

chapter 8|31 pages

The Legacy of War: Contemporary Razvedka