Inference has long been a central concern in epistemology, as an essential means by which we extend our knowledge and test our beliefs. Inference is also a key notion in influential psychological accounts of mental capacities, ranging from problem-solving to perception. Consciousness, on the other hand, has arguably been the defining interest of philosophy of mind over recent decades. Comparatively little attention, however, has been devoted to the significance of consciousness for the proper understanding of the nature and role of inference. It is commonly suggested that inference may be either conscious or unconscious. Yet how unified are these various supposed instances of inference? Does either enjoy explanatory priority in relation to the other? In what way, or ways, can an inference be conscious, or fail to be conscious, and how does this matter? This book brings together original essays from established scholars and emerging theorists that showcase how several current debates in epistemology, philosophy of psychology and philosophy of mind can benefit from more reflections on these and related questions about the significance of consciousness for inference.

chapter |12 pages


Inference and Consciousness
Edited ByAnders Nes

part I|84 pages

Unconscious Inference in Cognitive Science and Psychiatry

chapter 1|25 pages

Unconscious Inference Theories of Cognitive Achievement

ByKirk Ludwig, Wade Munroe

chapter 2|34 pages

A Realist Perspective on Bayesian Cognitive Science

ByMichael Rescorla

chapter 3|23 pages

The Role of Unconscious Inference in Models of Delusion Formation

ByFederico Bongiorno, Lisa Bortolotti

part II|51 pages

Inference in Speech Comprehension

chapter 4|26 pages

Seeing and Hearing Meanings

A Non-Inferential Approach to Speech Comprehension
ByBerit Brogaard

chapter 5|23 pages

Metacognition and Inferential Accounts of Communication

ByNicholas Allott

part III|48 pages

Inference, Structure, and Generality

chapter 6|21 pages

Non-Inferential Transitions

Imagery and Association
ByJake Quilty-Dunn, Eric Mandelbaum

part IV|56 pages

Conscious Non-Demonstrative Inference

chapter 8|30 pages

Fore- and Background in Conscious Non-Demonstrative Inference

Edited ByAnders Nes

chapter 9|24 pages

Morphological Content and Chromatic Illumination in Belief Fixation

ByDavid Henderson, Terry Horgan, Matjaž Potrč

part V|37 pages

Inference and Perceptual and Introspective Knowledge

chapter 10|20 pages

Experience and Epistemic Structure

Can Cognitive Penetration Result in Epistemic Downgrade? 1
ByElijah Chudnoff

chapter 11|15 pages

The Transparency of Inference

ByRam Neta